1 Paul VI, (Rome: January 1, 1972).

364.] * In a separate memorandum written the same year McCloy recalled: "General Marshall was right when he said you must not ask me to declare that a surprise nuclear attack on Japan is a military necessity.

I was traveling during muchof this period.

(C) Related to the problem of tone is the fact thathistorically this issue was not always so polarized, nor was italways seen as a liberal-versus-conservative matter--and in myview it should not be seen as such now.


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The unexpected cut-off of H-DIPLO debate (andthe Christmas/semester break) forced a bit of delay.

I can recall as if it were yesterday, [Marshall's] insistence to me that whether we should drop an atomic bomb on Japan was a matter for the President to decide, not the Chief of Staff since it was not a military question .


110.] The writer is not a revisionist; he is J.

336.] * Personally dictated notes found in the papers of former Ambassador to the Soviet Union Averell Harriman describe a private 1965 dinner with General Carl "Tooey" Spaatz, who in July 1945 commanded the U.S.

Samuel Walker,Chief Historian of the U.S.

334.] In his 1949 memoirs Arnold observed that "it always appeared to us that, atomic bomb or no atomic bomb, the Japanese were already on the verge of collapse." [THE DECISION, p.

NEWS AND WORLD REPORT) published astrongly worded two-page editorial:

The factis there is also no record of military leaders advising PresidentTruman TO USE THE BOMB: We simply have little solid information one way or the otheron what was said by top military leaders on the key question atthe time: There are very few direct contemporaneous records onthis subject.

(See, for instance, Uday Mohan, H-DIPLO, Oct.

Since the issue is soimportant and so poorly understood, let me reproduce a samplingof the (old and new) material presented in THE DECISION:* In his memoirs Admiral William D.

3, 1996.) II: MILITARY NECESSITY.

On the other hand, what little contemporaneous evidence wedo have strongly suggests that BEFORE the atomic bomb was used atleast two of the four members of the Joint Chiefs did not believethat military considerations required the destruction of Japanesecities without advance warning.