Already registered? Sign in with your Pearson account.

Given the nature of man, factions are inevitable. As long as men hold different opinions, have different amounts of wealth, and own different amount of property, they will continue to fraternize with people who are most similar to them. Both serious and trivial reasons account for the formation of factions but the most important source of faction is the unequal distribution of property. Men of greater ability and talent tend to possess more property than those of lesser ability, and since the first object of government is to protect and encourage ability, it follows that the rights of property owners must be protected. Property is divided unequally, and, in addition, there are many different kinds of property. and men have different interests depending upon the kind of property they own. For example, the interests of landowners differ from those who own businesses. Government must not only protect the conflicting interests of property owners but must, at the same time, successfully regulate the conflicts between those with and without property.

Click the Sign-In button, and enter the login name and password that you created when registering.

The following examples illustrate citations using author-date style. Each example of a reference list entry is accompanied by an example of a corresponding parenthetical citation in the text. For more details and many more examples, see chapters 18 and 19 of Turabian. For examples of the same citations using the notes-bibliography system, click on the Notes-Bibliography tab above.


Volume 5, Bill of Rights, Document 7

I propose in a series of papers to discuss the following interesting particulars——and lastly, .

I go further, and affirm that bills of rights, in the senseand in the extent in which they are contended for, are notonly unnecessary in the proposed constitution, but wouldeven be dangerous. They would contain various exceptionsto powers which are not granted; and on this veryaccount, would afford a colourable pretext to claim morethan were granted. For why declare that things shall notbe done which there is no power to do? Why for instance,should it be said, that the liberty of the press shall not berestrained, when no power is given by which restrictionsmay be imposed? I will not contend that such a provisionwould confer a regulating power; but it is evident that itwould furnish, to men disposed to usurp, a plausible pretencefor claiming that power. They might urge with asemblance of reason, that the constitution ought not to becharged with the absurdity of providing against the abuseof an authority, which was not given, and that the provisionagainst restraining the liberty of the press afforded aclear implication, that a power to prescribe proper regulationsconcerning it, was intended to be vested in the nationalgovernment. This may serve as a specimen of thenumerous handles which would be given to the doctrineof constructive powers, by the indulgence of an injudiciouszeal for bills of rights.


“always” inserted at this point in Hopkins.

In this Federalist Paper, explains and defends the system in the . Each is framed so that its power checks the power of the other two branches; additionally, each branch of government is dependent on the people, who are the source of legitimate authority.

“thoroughly” substituted for “much” in McLean.

Madison concludes that he presents these previous arguments because he is confident that many will not listen to those "prophets of gloom" who say that the proposed government is unworkable. For this founding father, it seems incredible that these gloomy voices suggest abandonment of the idea of coming together in strength ­- the states still have common interests. Madison concludes that "according to the degree of pleasure and pride we feel in being Republicans, ought to be our zeal in cherishing the spirit and supporting the character of Federalists."

“actuated” substituted for “influenced” in Hopkins.

But a minute detail of particular rights is certainly farless applicable to a constitution like that under consideration,which is merely intended to regulate the general politicalinterests of the nation, than to a constitution whichhas the regulation of every species of personal and privateconcerns. If therefore the loud clamours against the planof the convention on this score, are well founded, no epithetsof reprobation will be too strong for the constitutionof this state. But the truth is, that both of them contain all,which in relation to their objects, is reasonably to be desired.